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When an acquirer purchases a target and assumes the target’s deferred revenue liability, 
accounting standards codification 805 requires that the acquirer recognize the target’s deferred 
revenue at its estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. If the target’s deferred revenue book 
value exceeds its fair value, the portion of deferred revenue written down will never be 
recognized as revenue for the acquirer under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
In this study, I investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) compensation 
incentives on the fair value measurement of deferred revenue liabilities in acquisitions. If a larger 
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay is based on performance metrics tied to GAAP revenue, 
CEOs have incentives to minimize deferred revenue write-downs because these write-downs 
reduce post-acquisition revenues. I predict and find that CEOs with a larger proportion of cash 
incentive pay based on performance metrics tied to GAAP revenue write down less deferred 
revenues. Additionally, I predict and find that CEOs with a larger proportion of cash incentive 
pay based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for deferred revenues which would have been 
recognized as future revenues (i.e., ghost revenues) write down more deferred revenues. These 
results provide evidence that manager opportunism in fair value measurement following 
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 
Fair value measurement allows managers to exercise discretion for either informative or 
opportunistic reasons. When accounting for business combinations, managers appear to adjust 
the fair values of certain acquired assets in order to increase their compensation (e.g. Shalev et 
al. 2013). However, there are no studies investigating whether managers exercise discretion over 
the fair value measurement of deferred revenue liabilities assumed in acquisitions. Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) 805 (previously classified as Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) 141R) requires that the acquirer recognize the target’s deferred revenue 
liability at its estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. Because deferred revenue is 
typically recorded on the balance sheet at historical cost (i.e., the value of the consideration or 
payment previously received), the book value of a target’s deferred revenue often exceeds its fair 
value, leading to a deferred revenue write-down.1 Under generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), the acquirer cannot recognize the portion of the deferred revenue written 
down as post-acquisition revenue even if the acquirer satisfies the related performance 
obligations.  
In this study, I investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) compensation 
incentives on deferred revenue write-downs. When CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on 
accounting performance metrics tied to post-acquisition GAAP revenue, CEOs have incentives 
to minimize deferred revenue write-downs in order to maximize the revenue recognized under 
GAAP. Therefore, I predict that CEOs of acquirers with a larger proportion of cash incentive pay 
based on GAAP revenue (i.e., EBITDA, GAAP earnings, GAAP revenue, etc.) will reduce the 
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs.  
 
1 “Deferred revenue write-down” is the difference between the book value and fair value of a target’s deferred 
revenue liability assumed by the acquirer as of the acquisition completion date.  
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Separate streams of accounting research examine the usefulness of deferred revenue 
liabilities and the usefulness of fair value accounting. For example, prior research finds that 
previous regulations accounting for deferred revenues have decreased the likelihood of 
managerial opportunistic behavior, but have also reduced the value relevance of earnings and 
have led to the mismatching of revenues and expenses (Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber 2005; 
Prakash and Sinha 2013; Srivastava 2014). However, prior research evaluating the usefulness of 
deferred revenues does not consider how managers' compensation incentives may influence the 
fair values of deferred revenues in an acquisition.  
Fair value measurement of assets and liabilities often requires significant judgment and 
allows managers the ability to exercise discretion. Prior studies find mixed evidence of manager 
opportunism in fair value measurement. Some evidence suggests that certain bank assets and 
liabilities are value relevant consistent with managers recording appropriate fair values (e.g. 
Barth 1994; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1996; Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan 1996; Nelson 
1996). In contrast, some evidence suggests that managers exercise discretion in fair value-based 
goodwill impairment tests by delaying or reducing the occurrence of goodwill impairments (e.g. 
Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li and Sloan 2017). Further evidence 
suggests that when accounting for business combinations, managers exercise discretion over the 
fair values of acquired assets (Shalev 2009; Shalev et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015; 
Paugam, Astolfi, and Ramond 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2017; Lynch, Romney, Stomberg, and 
Wangerin 2019; Ashby, Chyz, Myers, and Whipple 2020). However, prior research does not 
consider whether managers exercise discretion over the fair value measurement of deferred 
revenues assumed in an acquisition. These studies assume that the fair value measurement of 
acquired assets and liabilities resembles a purchase price allocation. This means that, holding the 
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deal value constant, a larger fair value measurement of one acquired asset leads to a smaller fair 
value measurement of another acquired asset. However, the fair value measurement of liabilities 
in an acquisition does not necessarily resemble a purchase price allocation because, all else 
equal, an increase (decrease) in the fair value of liabilities leads to an increase (decrease) in 
goodwill. 
Fair value measurement of acquired deferred revenues is of particular concern to 
managers, institutional investors, and regulators for several reasons. Deferred revenue write-
downs have a significant downward impact on post-acquisition GAAP performance (Dickinson, 
Wangerin, and Wild 2016).2 Some managers disclose non-GAAP metrics which include a 
portion of the deferred revenue write-down that would have been earned during the period. The 
business press refers to these inclusions as “ghost revenues.”3 Although managers claim that the 
inclusion is meant to inform investors or increase comparability, recent evidence suggests that 
non-GAAP revenue that includes ghost revenue is not incrementally more value relevant than 
GAAP revenue on average (Campbell, Gee, and Wiebe 2020). The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) expresses concerns about non-GAAP metrics that include these adjustments 
and in some situations issues comment letters either requiring more disclosure or requiring the 
firm to cease reporting non-GAAP revenue.4 Furthermore, some firms add back ghost revenues 
to managers’ performance metrics. This practice has drawn criticism from the business press 
 
2 The association between deferred revenue write-downs and future revenues exists because deferred revenue write-
downs reduce future revenues recognized by the acquirer. Managers or valuation experts do not predict and assign a 
fair value to the expected future revenues and then determine what the deferred revenue balance should be. Rather, 
they begin their valuation with the deferred revenue book value. 
3 See “Companies including Symantec are using ‘ghost revenue’ to calculate bonuses” available from Marketwatch 
(May 17, 2018) at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/companies-are-using-ghost-revenue-to-calculate-executive-
bonuses-2017-11-06 
4 See “SEC may be set to crack down on companies that adjust revenue” available from Marketwatch (November 




which claims that managers use deferred revenue write-downs as a “cookie-jar” reserve to boost 
cash incentive compensation.5 Concerns with the usefulness of these non-GAAP performance 
metrics have led institutional investors to petition the SEC to require more transparency in proxy 
statements for metrics used in calculating CEO compensation.6 Given managers’, investors’, and 
regulators’ growing concerns about ghost revenues and deferred revenues write-downs, research 
investigating managers’ incentives to adjust deferred revenues write-downs is important.  
To the extent managers have discretion over the fair values of deferred revenues, I expect 
that CEOs’ incentives to reduce the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increase with 
the relative magnitude of cash incentive pay. If CEOs can minimize the magnitude of deferred 
revenue write-downs, then they reduce potential ghost revenues or revenues that will not be 
recognized even when acquirers satisfy the performance obligations related to the deferred 
revenues. By using this strategy, CEOs can maximize their cash incentive compensation by 
increasing the chances of meeting performance metric targets tied to GAAP revenue. However, 
the incentive to minimize deferred revenue write-downs is less salient if CEOs’ compensation is 
based on non-GAAP metrics that either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues.  
To examine my research questions, I use a hand-collected sample of 334 material 
acquisitions from 2003 to 2018, where the SEC requires the acquirer to disclose the previous 
financial statements of the target and the pro forma financial statements of the combined entity.7 












write-downs disclosed under adjustments made in combining the target and acquirer. In 64 
percent of the deals in my sample, I find that the acquirer writes down the target’s deferred 
revenues to fair value. Deferred revenue write-downs appear to be economically significant, with 
the average write-down reducing future revenue per share by $0.15. 
Next, I use multivariate regression analyses to examine whether the magnitude of 
deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. 
Specifically, I regress deferred revenue write-downs on the proportion of CEO cash incentive 
pay to CEO total compensation and a vector of control variables. Consistent with my predictions, 
I find that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO 
cash incentive pay. My results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of 
cash incentive pay is associated with a 20 percent decrease in the deferred revenue write-downs. 
This is equivalent to a $0.03 increase in future revenue per share, on average. 
Next, I investigate whether the relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the 
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay differs when the cash incentive pay is based on non-
GAAP metrics that either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues. I find that the 
negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash 
incentive pay does not exist when CEO cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance 
metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues. This suggests that the incentives 
to minimize deferred revenue write-downs are less salient when CEO cash incentive pay is not 
based on post-acquisition GAAP revenue. 
I then explore the impact of each non-GAAP adjustment (either removing the target’s 
revenues or including ghost revenues) on the relation between deferred revenue write-downs and 
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that the negative relation between deferred 
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revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay that I document for 
executives with incentive pay based on GAAP accounting performance metrics is also present 
when the cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that remove the target’s 
revenues. However, I find that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and 
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash incentive pay is tied to 
non-GAAP performance metrics that include ghost revenues. Moreover, I provide evidence that 
the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with the proportion of CEO cash 
incentive pay tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that include ghost revenues.  
Finally, I examine whether the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases 
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that the occurrence of deferred revenue 
write-downs does not decrease with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. However, 
economic factors appear to impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. Moreover, I 
find that that the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP metrics does not 
impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. These results suggest that although 
CEOs may exercise discretion in determining the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs, 
their discretion does not extend to avoiding the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs.  
My study makes several contributions to the literature. First, my study is the first to 
provide evidence that CEO compensation incentives impact the fair value measurement of 
deferred revenue liabilities in an acquisition. This is significant because most prior research 
focuses on managers’ incentives to adjust fair values of specific assets acquired in an acquisition 
(Shalev 2009; Shalev et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015; Paugam et al. 2015; Zhang and 
Zhang 2017; Lynch et al. 2019, Ashby et al. 2020). Furthermore, these studies focus on 
managers' incentives to adjust asset fair values that impact acquirers’ future expenses. For 
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example, Lynch et al. (2019) find that managers of private firms allocate more of the purchase 
price to shorter-lived tangible assets in order to increase depreciation and reduce taxable income. 
My study is the first to provide evidence of managers adjusting deferred revenue fair values to 
increase future revenues for the acquirer. 
Second, my study contributes to the research on non-GAAP disclosure. Recent evidence 
suggests that non-GAAP earnings per share is more informative when a firm discloses the metric 
in both the proxy statement and the annual earnings announcement (Black, Black, Christensen, 
and Gee 2020). However, no research to date investigates the impact of non-GAAP 
compensation performance metrics on GAAP accounting choices. I provide unique evidence 
suggesting that certain non-GAAP compensation performance metrics can impact managers’ fair 
value measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions. 
Finally, I examine a setting that has received increased attention from standard setters. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has an ongoing project to research the 
potential alternatives for the recognition and measurement of deferred revenues in business 
combinations and recently issued a proposed Accounting Standards Update.8 To the extent that 
any new accounting standard increases managers’ opportunities to exercise discretion in fair 
value measurement, I provide evidence suggesting that certain managers may exercise discretion 
in the fair value measurement of deferred revenue to boost post-acquisition revenues.  
  
 
8The board is currently reviewing the comment letter feedback to the proposed accounting standard update. See 




SECTION II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
Deferred revenues (also known as contract liabilities) are an obligation a firm has to 
transfer goods or services to a customer for which the firm has received payment from the 
customer. For instance, airlines most often sell flights to customers who make payments months 
in advance. Software firms sell products with contracts that obligate the firms to provide services 
and upgrades in the future. Some manufacturers have sell-through contracts with merchandisers 
or distributors and are only able to recognize revenue when the product is sold to the final 
customer. Generally, when firms fulfill the performance obligations, they can reduce the liability 
balance and recognize revenue.9  
Acquisitions of targets with deferred revenue liabilities are a common occurrence.10 One 
common issue for acquirers of targets with deferred revenue balances is deferred revenue write-
downs – often referred to as disappearing revenues11 or a revenue haircut.12 Deferred revenue 
write-downs arise from the differences in accounting treatment of deferred revenues in the 
normal course of business and of deferred revenues that a firm assumes in a merger or 
acquisition. Deferred revenues are generally recorded on the target’s balance sheet at historical 
cost (the value of the consideration or payment previously received). However, ASC 805 
requires that the acquirer record the target’s assets and liabilities at fair value as of the 
 
9 Up until the end of 2017, ASC 605 was the prevailing standard for deferred revenue. The FASB replaced ASC 605 
with ASC 606 to remove weaknesses in the existing requirements, increase the comparability of revenue recognition 
practices, and to provide a new framework to address revenue issues. However, under both standards firms record 
the deferred revenue liability at historical cost, firms do not adjust the book value to fair value each period, and 
firms must fulfil the performance obligations to reduce the liability balance and recognize revenue. 
10 In my sample of deal observations identified by SDC that merged with the Compustat database, 52% of the public 





acquisition date.13 Similar to other assets and liabilities, the historical cost of deferred revenue 
often differs from its fair market value.  
To determine the fair market value of deferred revenue, the acquirer must identify all 
performance obligations the acquirer assumes, estimate the costs required to fulfill the 
performance obligations, and estimate a profit mark-up associated with the costs to fulfill the 
obligation. After estimating the costs and profit mark-up, the acquirer must either use the 
bottom-up approach or top-down approach to calculate the fair value. The bottom-up approach 
calculates the fair value of deferred revenue as the costs to fulfill the future performance 
obligations plus a reasonable mark-up on the costs to be incurred. The top-down approach 
calculates the fair value by starting with the deferred revenue balance and deducting the 
previously incurred costs and the associated profit from the incurred costs. With either approach, 
the fair value should reflect what a third party would be willing to receive in exchange for 
assuming the deferred revenue liability and performance obligations. If a third party would incur 
lower costs for the future performance obligations and/or would be willing to accept a lower 
profit than the target’s normal profit, then the acquirer should write down deferred revenues.14, 15 
Deferred revenue write-downs can have a significant impact on post-acquisition 
performance. Dickinson et al. (2016) investigate how acquisition accounting methods may 
partially explain why many mergers and acquisitions show subsequent reduced firm 
 
13 SFAS 141 (effective July 2001) was updated in December 2008, to SFAS 141R, to improve the relevance of 
business combination reporting by updating the treatment of certain acquisition costs and target assets. Both SFAS 
141 and SFAS 141R (now codified as ASC 805) require that the acquirer record the target’s assets and liabilities at 
their fair values as of the acquisition date. 
14 It is also possible that deferred revenues can have a fair value write-up. However, this may be a sign that the target 
firm is underperforming and could have accepted a larger profit mark-up on the goods or services provided. Because 
write-ups are outside the scope of this paper and these particular acquisitions may be significantly different from 






performance. They find that part of the decrease in post-acquisition performance stems from fair 
value adjustments that lower future gross profit margins through write-ups in inventory values 
and write-downs in deferred revenues. In additional analyses, Dickinson et al. (2016) find that 
investors and analysts do not appear to understand how these fair value adjustments negatively 
impact gross margins. Dickinson et al. (2016) conclude that acquisition accounting standards 
requiring write-downs of deferred revenue and write-ups of inventory masks some of the 
synergistic efficiencies of the combined entity.  
In response to these deferred revenue write-downs affecting post-acquisition 
performance, some firms report non-GAAP revenues in earnings announcements with an 
adjustment for ghost revenues. Although managers often disclose that this adjustment is meant to 
inform investors or increase comparability, the inclusion of ghost revenues in non-GAAP 
revenues is not incrementally more value-relevant than GAAP revenues (Campbell et al. 2020). 
The SEC responds to these disclosures by issuing comment letters to some firms requiring 
managers to disclose why they are reporting deferred revenue adjustments or by requiring 
managers to cease reporting the adjusted revenue metrics.16 Some of these firms also add back 
ghost revenues to managers’ cash incentive performance metrics, drawing criticism from the 
business press which claims that managers use these write-downs as a “cookie-jar” reserve used 
to boost cash incentive compensation.17 Concerns with the transparency of non-GAAP 








Regulation G and require firms using non-GAAP financial metrics in calculating cash incentive 
to reconcile the adjusted metrics to GAAP metrics in the compensation discussion and analysis.18 
Due to managers’, investors’, and regulators’ concerns with deferred revenue write-
downs, the FASB initiated a project to research potential alternatives for the recognition and 
measurement of deferred revenues in business combinations.19 Recently, the board issued 
proposed Accounting Standards Update Business Combinations (Topic 805): Accounting for 
Contract Assets and Contract Liabilities from Contracts with Customers. 20 The proposed 
standard would require firms to recognize assumed deferred revenues following ASC 606. 
Specifically, the board proposed that the timing of payment of consideration on a contract should 
no longer affect the amount of revenue recognized by the acquirer. Based on the current 
standard, an acquirer would recognize more revenue for the same performance obligations if the 
target’s contract with customers requires payments over time rather than full payment in advance 
of the performance obligations. Removing the effect of payment timing on revenue contracts 
would change the accounting for acquired deferred revenue. Due to the board’s concerns with 
the potential costs and benefits of implementing a new standard, research investigating 




18 See the Council of Institutional Investors’ petition at  
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2019/20190426%20CII%20Petition%20revised%20
on%20non-GAAP%20financials%20in%20proxy%20statement%20CDAs.pdf  
19 See FASB’s research project list under “Recognition and Measurement of Revenue Contracts with Customers 
under Topic 805” for details at: 
https://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContent_C&cid=1176169433424&d=&pagename=FASB%2FFAS
BContent_C%2FProjectUpdatePage#Recognition_Measurement 
20 The board is currently reviewing the comment letter feedback to the proposed accounting standard update. See 




Deferred Revenue Literature 
Prior research generally focuses on the impact of previous regulations on the decision 
usefulness of revenues and deferred revenues. Standard setters issued the Statement of Position 
(SOP) 97-2 in December of 1997 to mitigate software firms’ ability to shift between deferred 
revenues and revenue across reporting periods. Following its implementation, firms were less 
likely to manage earnings via discretionary revenue estimates, but the overall value relevance of 
earnings decreased (Srivastava 2014). Two years later, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 
(SAB) no. 101 to restrict accelerated revenue recognition. Evidence suggests that SAB no. 101 
led to a decrease in the likelihood of firms meeting earnings benchmarks (Altamuro et al. 2005). 
However, evidence of managers' opportunistic use of discretion in deferred revenues remains 
(Caylor 2010). Other research suggests that the prevailing standards led to mismatching of 
revenues and expenses as evidenced by changes in deferred revenues adversely affecting the 
persistence of profit margins (Prakash and Sinha 2013).  
In 2010, the FASB adopted both ASU 2009-13 to address accounting for transactions 
with multiple deliverables and ASU 2009-14 to amend SOP 97-2 to improve the usefulness of 
revenues by allowing managers more discretion. Recent evidence suggests that these updates 
lead to an increase in the value relevance of revenues and earnings, with no evidence of a 
decrease in the faithful representation of reported revenues (Myers et al. 2020).  
Overall, research provides some evidence that managers exercise discretion over deferred 
revenue for either informative or opportunistic reasons. However, no research to date 
investigates the determinants of deferred revenue fair values (or write-downs) in an acquisition 




Fair Value Literature  
Fair value measurement of assets and liabilities requires judgment and allows managers 
to exercise discretion. Prior studies find mixed evidence of manager opportunism in fair value 
measurement. Early studies find that banks’ fair value disclosures of loans, securities, long-term 
debt, and financial instruments are value relevant (Barth 1994; Barth et al. 1996; Eccher et al. 
1996; Nelson 1996). Fair value estimates of investment properties tend to be more accurate 
measures of selling prices than historical costs (Dietrich, Harris, and Muller 2000). More recent 
evidence suggests that fair value measurement reduces information asymmetry among investors 
(Fontes, Panaretou, and Peasnell 2018) and better reflects banks' credit risk (Blankespoor, 
Linsmeier, Petroni, and Shakespeare 2013). In contrast, some evidence suggests that managers 
exercise discretion in fair value-based goodwill impairment tests by delaying or reducing the 
occurrence of goodwill impairments (Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li and 
Sloan 2017). CEOs exercise discretion in determining gains from asset securitizations and are 
rewarded for gains they report (Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare 2010). More recent studies 
find that the relevance of fair values may depend on the nature of the information used in fair 
value measurement. SFAS no. 157 requires the disclosure of the level of inputs used to generate 
the fair values (i.e. Levels 1, 2, and 3). Evidence suggests that Level 3 measurement of assets and 
liabilities, which requires the greatest amount of judgment, leads to increased analyst forecast 
dispersions and is less value relevant than other levels of measurement (Song, Thomas, and Yi 
2010; Magnan, Menini, and Parbonetti 2015).  
 Research suggests that managers exercise discretion in fair values of assets assumed in an 
acquisition following the implementation of SFAS 141 and SFAS 141R. A majority of acquired 
assets, being intangible assets and goodwill, do not have quoted market prices which allow 
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managers to exercise discretion by choosing from a reasonable range of possible values (Zhang 
and Zhang 2017; Lynch et al. 2019). Managers have incentives to exercise discretion in 
assigning fair values to assets and liabilities in an acquisition (also referred to as a purchase price 
allocation) to mitigate the negative impact acquired assets (and liabilities) can have on earnings. 
For example, larger allocations to tangible and definite-lived intangible assets increase 
depreciation and amortization expense, respectively, whereas allocations to goodwill are not 
amortized but are subject to impairment testing. Most purchase price allocation research focuses 
on managers’ incentives to “over-allocate” the purchase price to goodwill (Shalev 2009; Shalev 
et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015; Paugam et al. 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2017). 
Specifically, some studies find evidence that the proportion of the purchase price allocated to 
goodwill increases with the proportion of bonuses in CEOs’ pay packages consistent with 
managers allocating more to goodwill to reduce amortization and depreciation (Shalev et al. 
2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015). Ashby et al. (2020) find that managers who report non-GAAP 
earnings excluding amortization expense allocate more of the purchase price to definite-lived 
intangible assets and less of the purchase price to tangible assets. Finally, Lynch et al. (2019) 
find that managers of private firms, who bear lower financial reporting costs, have tax incentives 
to allocate more of the purchase price to tangible assets which increases depreciation and reduces 
taxable income. 
 In contrast to conclusions drawn from the purchase price allocation literature, recent 
research has highlighted evidence of the overall decision usefulness of fair value accounting in 
acquisitions. Particularly, the recorded fair values of acquired intangibles are predictive of future 
operating incomes and are positively associated with equity prices (King, Linsmeir, and 
Wangerin 2019; McInnis and Monsen 2020). Additionally, the aggregate fair value adjustments 
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made to a target are predictive of post-acquisition cash flows (Blann, Campbell, Shipman, and 
Wiebe 2020). However, this relation only exists when the target and acquirer are in the same 
industry, when the target does not have significant research and development costs, and when 
managers have less incentive to inflate goodwill balances (Blann et al. 2020).  
Overall, prior research provides some evidence of managers exercising discretion in fair 
values and, in some scenarios, being rewarded for doing so (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; Shalev et 
al. 2013). However, no prior research investigates whether managers exercise discretion over the 
fair value measurement of deferred revenues. The extant merger and acquisition research 
assumes that the fair value measurement of acquired assets and liabilities resembles a purchase 
price allocation. This means that, holding the deal value constant, a larger allocation to an 
acquired asset leads to a smaller allocation of another acquired asset. However, the fair value 
measurement of liabilities in an acquisition does not mechanically resemble an allocation choice 
because an increase (decrease) in the fair value of an assumed liability leads to an increase 
(decrease) in an acquired asset (most likely goodwill). Because the fair value measurement of 
liabilities does not resemble a purchase price allocation, it is not initially clear whether the 
incentives to adjust the fair values of assumed liabilities are similar to the incentives to adjust the 
fair values of acquired assets. 
Hypothesis Development  
 I begin motivating my hypotheses using a stylized example comparing two scenarios with 
different valuations of a target’s deferred revenue assumed by an acquirer in an acquisition on 
the first day of the acquirer’s fiscal year. The first scenario shows the outcome of an acquisition 
with no deferred revenue write-down. The second scenario shows the outcome of an acquisition 
with a deferred revenue write-down. In each scenario, I assume that the target’s deal value is 
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$781 million. I also assume the target’s sales for the acquisition year would have been $732 
million had it not been acquired and had it not written down any deferred revenue. I further 
assume that the acquirer’s sales excluding the target’s sales are $1.574 billion. Additionally, I 
assume that the fair value for all assets except goodwill is $582 million, and the fair value for all 
liabilities other than deferred revenues is $209 million. Finally, I assume that the book value of 
deferred revenue is $42 million, all the performance obligations associated with the $42 million 
in deferred revenue on the target books will be fulfilled in the fiscal year of the acquisition, and 
that the deferred revenue write-down in scenario (2) is $16 million.21  
Scenario  (1) (2) 







Tangible and Intangible Assets other 
than Goodwill 
$582,000,000 $582,000,000 
Goodwill $450,000,000 $434,000,000  
Liabilities other than Deferred 
Revenue ($209,000,000) ($209,000,000) 
   
Deferred Revenue  ($42,000,000)  ($26,000,000) 
(Book Value = $42 million)   
Total Deal Value $781,000,000 $781,000,000 
   
Acquisition Year Revenue Results    
   
Acquirer’s Revenue (Pro-forma) 1,574,000,000 1,574,000,000 
   
Target’s Revenue (Pro-forma) 732,000,000 716,000,000 
   
Combined Revenue 2,306,000,000 2,290,000,000 
   
Decrease in Revenue  16,000,000 
   
Acquirer’s Diluted Shares  109,000,000 
   
 
21 All values in this stylized example roughly approximate the average values found in my sample of 334 deal 
observation used in this study.  
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Per-share impact of write-down  $ 0.15 
   
When comparing the scenarios, it is clear that the acquirer has the largest GAAP 
revenue in scenario (1) where there is no deferred revenue write-down. When taking the 
difference between the two scenarios, a $16 million decrease in current deferred revenues 
leads to a $0.15 per share decrease in the acquirer’s post-acquisition revenue. With acquirers’ 
average post-acquisition earnings being $0.54 per share in my sample, all else equal, a 
deferred revenue write-down could remove more than a quarter of the acquirer’s post-
acquisition earnings. This stylized example highlights the material impact of deferred revenue 
write-downs on an acquirer’s post-acquisition performance.  
When holding the deal value constant, any changes in the recorded value of deferred 
revenues will also alter the goodwill fair value, as shown in my stylized example. Any 
increase (decrease) in the deferred revenue write-down is associated with a decrease 
(increase) in goodwill. Additionally, Shalev et al. (2013) find that the proportion of the 
purchase price recorded as goodwill increases with the proportion of bonus compensation in a 
CEO’s pay package.22 The fair value of goodwill may impact managers' incentives to adjust 
the fair value of deferred revenues. The risk of future impairments increases with the 
allocation of goodwill (Paugam et al. 2015). However, there is a limit to increasing the 
goodwill allocation that occurs with an adjustment to deferred revenue write-downs. The 
largest goodwill fair value occurs with no deferred revenue write-down.23 Due to this 
 
22 In untabulated analyses, I validate this finding. In this study, I do not investigate the consequences of the resulting 
goodwill allocation, or the impact of bonus compensation on the allocation to goodwill. However, I control for the 
allocation to goodwill in my main regressions to remove any confounding effects impacting the relation between the 
CEO cash incentive pay and deferred revenue write-downs. My inferences hold when I re-estimate without 
including the goodwill allocation in the regressions. 
23 It is also possible that deferred revenues can have a fair value write-up, leading to higher goodwill allocations. 
However, this occurrence is rare. Because write-ups are outside the scope of this paper and these particular 
acquisitions may be significantly different from normal acquisitions, I exclude observations in my sample where the 
acquirer writes up deferred revenues. Only 5 observations were dropped due to a deferred revenue write-up. 
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limitation, it is not clear that minimizing a deferred revenue write-down would lead to an 
“abnormal allocation” or “over-allocation” of goodwill that could lead to a significant 
increase in impairment risk. Additionally, an increase in goodwill would not impact managers' 
performance metrics in the short term, due to managers' ability to delay or reduce the 
occurrence of goodwill impairments (e.g., Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012; 
Li and Sloan 2017). 
If a CEO can exercise discretion over the fair values of deferred revenues, I expect that 
the CEO’s incentives to reduce the magnitude of a deferred revenue write-down increase with 
the relative importance of the cash incentive pay.24 Bonuses or non-equity incentive pay are 
more likely than other forms of compensation to increase with an increase in accounting 
performance metrics (Shalev et al. 2013). Prior research highlights that a majority of firms use 
multiple accounting metrics like reporting earnings, EBIT, or sales as performance measures (all 
of which are directly impacted by the target’s revenues post-acquisition) to determine CEO 
bonuses (Murphy 1999). Additionally, some research finds that CEO cash compensation is 
positively associated with accounting performance metrics (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003) 
and that the relative importance of accounting metric-based pay is positively associated with 
earnings management (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007). Overall, I expect that CEOs whose 
 
24 Note that I do not claim the CEOs are solely in charge of assigning the fair values of deferred revenue in an 
acquisition, but I focus on CEOs because they are the ultimate decisions makers. In addition, CEOs are likely aware 
of the impact of fair values of assets and liabilities on future firm performance. I expect managers, valuation experts, 
and/or the CFO to provide projections of the impact of an acquisition on future performance to CEOs, and if CEOs 
believe that these projections are understated, the CEO may request that the valuations of assets and liabilities be 
adjusted. CEOs are likely to hire managers who agree with their point of view and who are incentivized to support 
the CEOs' preferences. Therefore, lower-level managers may adjust deferred revenue fair values if requested to do 
so. Although I do not claim that all CEOs or managers will intentionally manipulate deferred revenue fair values, I 
do assert that managers have implicit biases concerning the valuation of assets and liabilities as well as reported 
performance and may be likely to adjust fair values to be consistent with those preferences.  
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cash incentive pay constitutes a larger portion of their annual pay are likely to benefit more from 
reducing the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: The magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs is smaller when the proportion of          
CEO cash incentive pay is larger. 
My predicted relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO 
cash incentive pay can be attenuated for a few reasons. First, valuation experts and auditors 
constrain managers’ discretion over the fair value measurement of deferred revenues. Auditors 
and valuation experts may approach their review of liabilities with greater scrutiny than assets. 
However, valuation is subjective and even with the scrutiny of valuation experts and auditors, 
managers can assign a range of appropriate fair values for the assets and liabilities assumed in 
the acquisition. Additionally, auditors and valuation experts are more likely to be concerned 
about an understatement of liabilities than an overstatement of liabilities and may mistakenly 
apply more scrutiny to smaller deferred revenue fair values than larger deferred revenue fair 
values. Second, there is plausibly less judgment involved in determining the fair values of 
deferred revenues than for acquired assets. This is because significant asset classes such as 
intangible assets, are more likely than deferred revenues to be firm-specific and firm-specific 
assets tend to require more judgment. However, there is still a considerable amount of judgment 
involved in assessing the fair value of deferred revenues. Managers need to consider multiple 
factors related to the fair value of deferred revenues including cost overhead allocations, 
estimation of the profit mark-up, multiple element arrangements, and discount rates. Third, if 
CEOs do not consider bonus compensation important, incentives to exercise discretion over the 
fair values of deferred revenues may not exist. Some research provides evidence suggesting that 
cash compensation plays a limited role in providing incentives to managers, inferring that bonus 
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or non-equity incentive compensation may not significantly affect managers' choices (Core, 
Guay and Verrecchia 2003). However, Murphy (2013) argues that CEOs better understand the 
impact of their actions on accounting metrics than on stock prices, and bonuses tied to these 
metrics are more tangible and immediate than compensation tied to equity. Additionally, some 
research investigating the impact of bonus compensation suggests that bonuses can affect 
managers' accounting choices (Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams 2000; Shalev et al. 2013). 
Finally, CEOs may face potential post-acquisition consequences as a result of adjusting the fair 
value of deferred revenues. For example, the SEC issues comment letters to acquirers regarding 
the fair value measurement of acquired assets and liabilities (Lynch et al. 2019). Potential SEC 
scrutiny may constrain managers’ discretion over the fair value of deferred revenues. 
Furthermore, the reputational cost of receiving a comment letter addressing fair value 
measurement may also constrain managers’ discretion. 
Although prior research finds that accounting-based metrics tied to GAAP revenue are 
the most popular performance metrics in cash incentive pay compensation, many firms use non-
GAAP performance metrics. Recent research finds that approximately 15 percent of firms 
disclose a non-GAAP earnings per share performance metric in their proxy statements (Black et 
al. 2020). Additionally, some evidence suggests that CEO pay is abnormally high when non-
GAAP earnings significantly exceed GAAP earnings (Guest, Kothari, and Pozen 2020). In recent 
years, firms have started reporting non-GAAP revenue metrics, with 20 percent of earnings 
announcements including a non-GAAP revenue measure (Campbell et al. 2020). Some common 
adjustments include removing revenues resulting from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
(commonly called organic revenues) or including a portion of the deferred revenue write-down 
(i.e. ghost revenues) from an acquisition. Campbell et al. (2020) find that 43.3 percent of firms 
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that report non-GAAP revenue in the earnings announcement adjust for changes to the reporting 
entity (M&A, and divestitures), and 8.3 percent include ghost revenues. I expect CEOs with a 
larger proportion of cash incentive pay tied to a non-GAAP metric adjusted for the target’s 
revenues or ghost revenues to be less likely to directly benefit from reducing the magnitude of 
deferred revenue write-down. I also expect these CEOs to write down more of the deferred 
revenue relative to CEOs with a larger proportion of cash incentive pay based on performance 
metrics tied to GAAP revenue. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs is larger when the proportion of 
CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s 
revenue or ghost revenues is larger.  
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SECTION III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Data  
To test my hypotheses, I use a hand-collected sample of deal observations where the 
acquirer assumes the target's deferred revenue and discloses whether or not a write-down 
occurred. To create this sample, I first use Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum to identify 
completed business combinations with completion dates between January 1, 2003 and December 
31, 2018. I restrict the sample to U.S. public acquirers that merge with Compustat, and I exclude 
observations where either the acquirer or target are in the financial or utility sectors following 
Prakash and Sinha (2013). Next, I restrict the sample to material acquisitions where the acquirer 
is required by the SEC to disclose the target’s financial statements similar to the sample selection 
criteria in Chen (2019). An acquirer determines whether additional disclosure is required by 
using one of three tests defined in Regulation S-X. These tests are the following:  
1. Asset Test: If the target’s assets exceed 20 percent of the acquirer’s pre-acquisition 
assets, then disclosure of the target’s financial statements is required. 
2. Investment Test: If the purchase price of the target exceeds 20 percent of the 
acquirer’s pre-acquisition assets, then disclosure of the target’s financial statements is 
required. 
3. Income Test: If the target’s pre-acquisition pre-tax income exceeds 20 percent of the 
acquirer’s pre-acquisition pre-tax income, then disclosure of the target’s financial 
statements is required. 
To determine whether or not a target meets the disclosure requirements, I restrict my 
sample to firms where the deal value exceeds 20 percent of the acquirer's pre-acquisition total 
assets. For public targets, if the acquisition does not pass the investment test, I include the 
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sample of deal observations where the results of the income test or assets test exceed the 20 
percent threshold. Next, I determine which deal observations in my sample will likely disclose a 
deferred revenue balance in the financial statements. For public targets, I restrict the sample to 
target firms where deferred revenue is populated in Compustat in the fiscal year before the 
acquisition. For all other targets, I restrict the sample to firms where the deferred revenue for the 
acquirer is populated in Compustat in the fiscal year following the acquisition.  
Unless already recorded in the acquirer’s financial statements, the acquirer is required to 
report the balance sheet of the acquirer, the balance sheet of the target, and the combination of 
the two entities with any adjustments. If the acquirer assumes the target’s deferred revenue 
balance and the deferred revenues are written down, then the acquirer discloses the write-down 
in the adjustments. I examine the acquirer’s 8-K/A or S-4 filings for the acquisition and collect 
the deferred revenue book values, deferred revenue fair values, deferred revenue write-downs, 
and other control variables from the disclosed financial statements of the target. I exclude 
observations where there is no deferred revenue balance disclosed, no pro forma balance sheet, 
or no filings available. I also remove observations where the acquirer writes up the target's 
deferred revenue balance.  
Next, I merge ExecuComp to the hand-collected dataset for CEO compensation data. For 
all deal observations where ExecuComp data is unavailable, I hand-collect the required 
information related to the CEO’s compensation from the DEF 14A for the fiscal year of the 
acquisition completion. Using the SEC Analytics suite on the Wharton research data services 
(WRDS) website, I collect the links to the DEF 14A for the acquisition completion fiscal year. If 
no links were present, I use SEC’s EDGAR to collect the DEF 14A filing link. To investigate the 
impact of different performance metrics on the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs, I 
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collect the financial metrics used to assess the CEO’s annual performance and to calculate their 
short-term cash incentive compensation. I also use data from Compustat and the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct other control variables. I summarize my sample 
selection procedure in Table 1. Of the 810 observations identified as acquisitions that meet the 
SEC’s disclosure requirements and have a deferred revenue balance, 334 satisfy my data 
restrictions.  
Research Design 
To test my first hypothesis regarding the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs, I 
regress Def Rev Write Down on my variables of interest and control variables using the following 
ordinary least squares regression model:  
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑅 +
𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε (1) 
The dependent variable, Def Rev Write Down, is equal to the difference between the book 
value and the fair value of deferred revenue assumed in the acquisition as disclosed in the pro 
forma balance sheet or the deferred revenue write-down disclosed in the adjustment section of 
the pro forma balance sheet divided by the deal value. To measure the relative importance of 
CEO cash incentive pay, I use three different proxies derived from variables used in prior 
research (Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010; Shalev et al. 2013). The first, Bonus, is the 
CEO’s bonus compensation scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. The second, NEIP, is the 
CEO’s non-equity incentive pay compensation scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. The 
third, Bonus/NEIP, is the sum of the CEO’s bonus and non-equity incentive pay compensation 
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scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. A negative and significant  𝛽1 coefficient on each of the 
incentive pay proxies would be consistent with my prediction that the magnitude of deferred 
revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. 
To test my second hypothesis, I augment equation (1) to include NG, an indicator 
variable set equal to 1 if the cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that either 
removes the target’s revenue or includes ghost revenues, and 0 otherwise. I also include 
interactions between NG and each of the incentive pay variables. Given these adjustments, I use 
the following ordinary least squares model:  
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛿2𝑁𝐺 +
+ 𝛿3𝑁𝐺 ∗ (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) +  𝛿4𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛿5𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 +
𝛿6𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛿7𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛿8𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛿9𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛿10𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +
𝛿11𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛿12𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛿13𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛿14𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε (2) 
A positive and significant coefficient on 𝛿3 would be consistent with my prediction that the 
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive 
pay when tied to non-GAAP metrics. Detailed variable definitions for each test variable are 





SECTION IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in my analyses.25 The mean 
(median) deal value for acquisition observations in my sample is $780.7 million ($186 million). 
The mean deferred revenue assumed in the acquisition (at book value) is $41.93 million. 
Acquirers write down deferred revenues 64 percent of the time, suggesting that this is a common 
occurrence. Acquirers write down 32 percent of the book value of acquired deferred revenue, on 
average. When scaled by the number of shares used to calculate earnings per share, deferred 
revenues amounting to $0.15 per share will never be recognized or recorded as revenue 
following the acquisition, on average. I find that almost 20 percent of total CEO compensation is 
cash-based incentive pay, on average.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in my analyses where 
the observations are partitioned based on whether or not the deferred revenues assumed in the 
acquisition were written down (Write-Down). I find that Bonus is larger for acquirers that do not 
write down deferred revenues than for acquirers that write down deferred revenues (.113 versus 
.059; t-stat= 2.983). However, I find that NEIP is larger for acquirers that write down deferred 
revenues than for acquirers that do not write down deferred revenues (.090 versus .122; t-stat=-
1.926). I also find that Bonus/NEIP for the acquirers that write down deferred revenues is not 
statistically different from acquirers that do not write down deferred revenues (.204 versus .182; 
 
25In untabulated analyses, I investigate whether my inferences hold after addressing potential concerns about 
influential observations. Summary statistics in Table 2 reveal that even after winsorizing all continuous variables 
that are included in the regressions at the 1st and 99th percentiles, there are still extreme values at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. I calculate DFBETAs for my variables of interest and re-estimate equations (1) and (2) after removing 






t-stat= 1.111). These inconsistent and preliminary results may be occurring due to other 
characteristics of the acquirers or targets. Therefore, I perform multivariate analyses to control 
for other potential determinants of deferred revenue write-downs.  
Testing Hypothesis 1 
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1) investigating whether the 
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive 
pay. I estimate the regression three times using either Bonus, NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP, in columns 
(1), (2), and (3), respectively. In each of the regressions, I find that the coefficients on Bonus, 
NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically significant.26 These results suggest that the 
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive 
pay. Using the coefficient estimate on Bonus/NEIP in column (3), the results suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in the Bonus/NEIP leads to a decrease of $3.11 million in the 
deferred revenue write-down or a $3.11 million increase in post-acquisition GAAP revenues. 
Using the average of 109 million diluted shares for the acquirers in my sample, this equates to a 
$0.03 per share increase in future revenues. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that CEOs 
with larger proportions of cash incentive pay based on accounting performance metrics reduce 
the magnitude of the deferred revenue write-down and potential ghost revenues. 
Testing Hypothesis 2  
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (2) investigating whether the 
relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay 
differs when the cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s 
 
26 Because 35.6 percent of my sample contains  zero values for deferred revenue write-downs, using OLS to 
estimate the model potentially raises concerns that I might observe biased coefficients on my incentive pay variables 
due to a zero-inflated dependent variable. My inferences hold when I re-estimate equation (1) using a Tobit 
regression with and without fixed effects.  
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revenues or ghost revenues. I find that the coefficients on Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are 
negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the magnitude of deferred 
revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay when the 
incentive pay is tied to performance metrics that do not adjust for the target’s revenues or 
deferred revenues. Additionally, I find in columns (2) and (3) the interactions NEIP*NG and 
Bonus/NEIP*NG are positive and statistically significant. F-test results reveal that the 
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables (Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP) 
and their respective interactions with NG (Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, are Bonus/NEIP*NG) are not 
significantly different from zero. These results suggest that the negative relation between 
deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when 
the cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust for the target’s 
revenues or ghost revenues. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that CEOs with larger 
proportions of cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust for the 





SECTION V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Non-GAAP Adjustments  
Because Table 5 results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue 
write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash 
incentive pay is tied to certain non-GAAP performance metrics, I next explore the impact of each 
non-GAAP adjustment. To do this, in Table 6, I re-estimate equation (2) replacing NG with NG 
organic in columns (1) – (3), and NG Def Rev in columns (4) – (6). NG organic is an indicator 
variable set equal to 1 if the CEO’s cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that 
excludes the target's revenue, and 0 otherwise. NG Def Rev is an indicator variable set equal to 1 
if the CEO’s cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that includes ghost revenues, and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with prior results and my first hypothesis, I find that the coefficients on 
Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically significant. 
 I find in columns (1) – (3) that the interactions Bonus*NG organic, NEIP*NG organic, 
and Bonus/NEIP*NG organic are statistically insignificant. F-test results reveal that the 
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables and their respective interactions 
with NG organic are not significantly different from zero except for NEIP and NEIP*NG 
organic. These results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs 
and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay exists when the cash incentive pay is tied to non-
GAAP performance metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues. 
Additionally, I find in columns (5) and (6) that the interactions NEIP*NG Def Rev and 
Bonus/NEIP*NG Def Rev are positive and statistically significant. F-test results reveal that the 
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables and their respective interactions 
with NG Def Rev are significantly different from zero except for Bonus and Bonus*NG Def Rev. 
These results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the 
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proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash incentive pay is tied to non-
GAAP performance metrics that adjust for ghost revenues. Moreover, the significant F-test 
results in columns (5) and (6) suggest that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs 
increases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP performance metrics 
that adjust for ghost revenues (F-test P-values <0.01). Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that 
CEOs with larger proportions of cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP performance metrics 
that adjust for ghost revenues do not minimize deferred revenue write-downs.  
Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence  
Next, I investigate whether the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases 
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. To test this research question, I regress the 
indicator Write Down on the same variables of interest and control variables contained in the 
model (1) using the following linear probability model: 
Prob(𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 1| 𝑋) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴𝑅 +
𝛼3𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼4𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼7𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛼8𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼11𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛼12𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε (3) 
The dependent variable, Write Down, is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the acquirer 
disclosed in the pro forma balance sheet a write-down of the target’s deferred revenue assumed 
in the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Similar to equation (1), a negative and significant 𝛼1 
coefficient on each of the incentive pay proxies would be consistent with the occurrence of 
deferred revenue write-down decreasing with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay.  
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (3) investigating whether the 
occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash 
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incentive pay. Similar to Table 4, I estimate the regression three times using either Bonus, NEIP, 
or Bonus/NEIP, in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. In each of the regressions, I find that 
the coefficients on Bonus, NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically insignificant. 27 
These results suggest that the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs does not decrease 
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that that the occurrence of write-downs 
increases with the deferred revenue book value (Def Rev (Book)), the size of the target 
(DealSize), and the size of the acquirer (Relative). These results are consistent with larger 
balances of deferred revenue and larger entities being subject to more scrutiny from valuation 
experts, auditors, and/or regulators. I also find that the occurrence of deferred revenue write-
downs decreases with the profitability of the target (TrgPM). Overall, the occurrence of deferred 
revenue write-down appears to be determined by economic factors and not by compensation 
incentives of the acquirers’ CEOs.  
Additionally, I investigate whether these prior results differ when the cash incentive pay 
is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues. To test 
this research question, I use equation (3) but include NG, and interact NG with each of my 
incentive pay variables. I use the following linear probability model:  
Prob(𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 1| 𝑋) =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛾2𝑁𝐺 +
+ 𝛾3𝑁𝐺 ∗ (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) +  𝛾4𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛾5𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 +
𝛾6𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛾7𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛾8𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛾9𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛾10𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +
𝛾11𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾12𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾13𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛾14𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε (4) 
 
27 I continue to find insignificant coefficients on my cash incentive pay variables when estimating equation (3) and 
(4) using a logistic regression with and without fixed effects. 
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Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (4) investigating whether the 
relation between the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO 
cash incentive pay differs when the cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust 
for the target’s revenues or deferred revenue write-downs. I find that the coefficients on Bonus, 
NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are statistically insignificant.28 Additionally, I find that the coefficients 
on interactions Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG are statistically insignificant. These 
results suggest that the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not impact the occurrence of 
deferred revenue write-downs even when the incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that 
either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues. Overall, these results suggest that 
although CEOs may exercise discretion in determining the magnitude of deferred revenue write-




28 I continue to find insignificant coefficients on the interactions when estimating equation (4) using a logistic 
regression with and without fixed effects.  
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SECTION VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I investigate the impact of CEOs’ compensation incentives on the fair value 
measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions. If CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on 
performance metrics tied to post-acquisition GAAP revenue, CEOs have incentives to minimize 
the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs in order to maximize the revenue recognized 
post-acquisition. However, if CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics adjusted 
for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues, CEOs are less likely to benefit from reducing the 
magnitude of deferred revenue write-down. Therefore, I hypothesize that the magnitude of 
deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. 
Additionally, I hypothesize that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with 
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s 
revenues or ghost revenues. 
 Using a hand-collected sample of 334 material acquisitions, I find that 64 percent of 
sample firms write down deferred revenues to fair value and write down $0.15 per share on 
average. I find evidence that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the 
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay, consistent with my expectations. Next, I find that the 
negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash 
incentive pay does not exist when CEO cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance 
metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or deferred revenue write-downs. Furthermore, I find 
a positive relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash 
incentive pay when cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust 
for ghost revenues. In contrast, I find that the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs does 
not decrease with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. Finally, I find that CEO cash 
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incentive pay based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s revenue or ghost revenues 
does not impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. Overall, the occurrence of 
deferred revenue write-downs appears to be determined by economic factors and not by 
compensation incentives of the acquirers’ CEOs. 
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I provide distinctive evidence 
that certain managers have incentives to adjust the fair values of deferred revenues to increase 
future revenues for the acquirer, which is previously unexplored in the literature. Second, my 
study contributes to the research on non-GAAP disclosure and compensation by providing 
evidence that certain non-GAAP compensation performance metrics can impact fair value 
measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions. Lastly, I examine a topic of particular interest 
to practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. I investigate a topic of interest to the FASB 
given their ongoing project to research the potential alternatives for the recognition and 
measurement of deferred revenues in business combinations. The FASB recently proposed that 
the timing of payment of consideration on a contract should not affect the amount of revenue 
recognized by the acquirer. Under the current standard, an acquirer would recognize more 
revenues for the same performance obligations if the target’s contracts with customers require 
payments over time rather than full payment in advance of the performance obligations. This 
suggestion would potentially require more judgment in measuring acquired deferred revenues 
because managers would need to estimate the value of what the combined entity expects to 
receive at the time of the acquisition date. To the extent that any new accounting standard 
increases the judgment involved in determining the fair value of acquirer deferred revenue, I 
provide evidence suggesting that managers exercise discretion in the fair value measurement of 
deferred revenue to boost post-acquisition revenues. Additionally, my results should be of 
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interest to audit professionals and researchers. External auditors are now required to identify 
critical audit matters (CAMs) in audit reports. These are disclosures by auditors that identify 
material accounts or disclosures that involve especially challenging, complex, or subjective 
judgment during the audit engagement. In 2019, the most common CAM subjects were 
“Business Combinations” and “Revenues from customer contracts” (Burke, Hoitash, Hoitash, 
and Xiao 2020). My study examines an issue at the intersection of these important subject areas. 
I provide evidence suggesting that auditors should consider managers’ incentives to minimize 
deferred revenue write-downs and acknowledge the potentially subjective judgment involved in 
estimating deferred revenue fair values. Overall, the results of my study provide information of 
particular interest to practitioners, regulators, and standard setters who, when developing and 
implementing the standards surrounding deferred revenue valuation in acquisitions, must 
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Deal Value Deal value of the target reported in the 8-K/A or S-4 in 
millions  
Deferred Revenue Book Value Deferred revenue book value from the companies 8-K/A or 
S-4 in millions 
Deferred Revenue Fair Value Deferred revenue fair value from the companies 8-K/A or S-
4 in millions 
Deferred Revenue Write-Down Deferred revenue write-down from the companies 8-K/A or 
S-4 in millions 
Def Rev Fair Value Percent Deferred revenue fair value scaled by the deferred revenue 
book value 
Def Rev Write-Down Percent Deferred revenue write-down scaled by the Deferred 
Revenue Book-Value 
Def Rev (Book) Deferred revenue book value scaled by the target’s deal 
value 
Def Rev Write-Down Deferred revenue write-down scaled by the target’s deal 
value 
Write-Down Indicator variable equal to 1 if target’s deferred revenue is 
written down, and 0 otherwise 
Write-Down Per Share Target’s deferred revenue write-down scaled by the 
acquirer’s common shares (cshfd) at the end of the 
acquisition year 
Bonus Acquirer CEO's bonus compensation scaled by the acquirer 
CEO's total compensation in the year of the acquisition 
NEIP Acquirer CEO's non-equity incentive pay compensation 
scaled by the acquirer CEO's total compensation in the year 
of the acquisition 
Bonus/NEIP Sum of the acquirer CEO's non-equity incentive pay 
compensation and acquirer CEO's bonus compensation 
scaled by the acquirer CEO's total compensation in the year 
of the acquisition  
CAR Three-day cumulative abnormal return around the 
acquisition announcement; the abnormal return is computed 
using the market model, where the parameters of the model 
are estimated over the window (271,21) trading days 
preceding the acquisition announcement and the market 
return is measured as the return to the CRSP equally 
weighted index 
TrgPM Target’s operating earnings scaled by sales for the last fiscal 
year period reported in the target’s 8-K/A or S-4 or 
Compustat 
AcqPM Acquirer’s operating earnings scaled by sales 
PeerPM Median operating earnings scaled by sales for public firms in 
the target’s 2-digit SIC code industry  
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TrgPublic Indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a public firm, and 
0 otherwise 
PctStock Percentage of consideration paid for the target consisting of 
stock 
Relative Acquirer’s pre-acquisition total assets scaled by the target’s 
deal value  
DealSize Log of the target’s deal value 
SameInd Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target share 
the same 2-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise 
AcqMTB Acquirer’s pre-acquisition market to book ratio.  
Goodwill Target’s goodwill scaled by the target’s deal value reported 
in the target’s 8-K/A or S-4 
NG Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is 
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP 
earnings, etc.) that doesn't include the impact of revenues 
from the target or the deferred revenue write-downs, and 0 
otherwise 
NG Def Rev Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is 
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP 
earnings, etc.)  that adjusts for the deferred revenue write-
downs, and 0 otherwise 
NG Organic  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is 
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP 
earnings, etc.) that doesn't include the impact of revenues 














Number of material deals in SDC between January 2003 to December 2018 
where the acquirer has a deferred revenue balance post-acquisition (or where 
public targets have a deferred revenue balance pre-acquisition)  
810 
No 8-K/A or S-4, no pro forma balance sheet, or no deferred revenue balance 
reported  
(412) 
Deals with deferred revenue write-ups (5) 
Deals with missing Compustat data  (13) 
Deals with no CEO compensation data (missing DEF 14A and 
EXECUCOMP data)  
(19) 
Deals with no announcement return data (27) 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES (N =334) mean Std dev. p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 
        
Deal Value 780.7 2,001 2.704 39.47 186.0 538.1 13,041 
Deferred Revenue Book Value 41.93 141.6 0.039 1.373 6.059 25.30 601.3 
Deferred Revenue Fair Value 26.30 98.96 0.000 0.418 2.797 14.56 271 
Deferred Revenue Write-Down 15.68 62.30 0.000 0.000 1.002 7.235 354.5 
Def Rev Fair Value Percent 0.678 0.346 0.000 0.429 0.777 1.000 1.000 
Def Rev Write-Down Percent 0.324 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.571 1.000 
Write-Down Per Share 0.156 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.130 2.521 
Write-Down  0.644 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Def Rev Write-Down 0.037 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.612 
Bonus 0.0785 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0948 0.624 
NEIP 0.111 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.631 
Bonus/NEIP 0.190 0.166 0.000 0.0601 0.161 0.269 0.684 
Def Rev (Book) 0.102 0.167 0.000 0.0119 0.0414 0.114 0.989 
CAR 0.0109 0.126 -0.273 -0.040 0.00457 0.0628 0.420 
TrgPM -0.455 1.952 -13.11 -0.126 0.0284 0.122 0.352 
AcqPM 0.0236 0.365 -2.788 -0.004 0.0768 0.159 0.402 
PeerPM 0.0104 0.0788 -0.343 0.007 0.0318 0.0496 0.103 
TrgPublic 0.347 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PctStock 0.224 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 1.000 
Relative 3.378 3.951 0.204 1.585 2.799 3.810 31.10 
DealSize 5.046 1.857 0.995 3.675 5.226 6.288 9.476 
SameInd 0.707 0.456 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AcqMTB 4.370 5.925 -3.792 1.905 3.130 4.989 49.60 
Goodwill 0.544 0.253 0.000 0.380 0.538 0.725 1.272 
        
This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. I winsorize all continuous variables 









Partitioning Variable = Write-Down 
 
Write-Down = 0 Write-Down = 1 
 
 (N=119) (N=215)  
VARIABLES mean mean Difference 
       
Bonus 0.113 0.059 0.054*** 
NEIP 0.090 0.122 -0.032** 
Bonus/NEIP 0.204 0.182 0.022 
Def Rev (Book) 0.057 0.127 -0.07*** 
CAR 0.015 0.009 0.006 
TrgPM -0.385 -0.494 0.109 
AcqPM -0.019 0.047 -0.066* 
PeerPM -0.010 0.021 -0.031*** 
TrgPublic 0.294 0.377 -0.083* 
PctStock 0.257 0.205 0.052* 
Relative 3.115 3.524 -0.409 
DealSize 4.584 5.302 -0.718*** 
SameInd 0.647 0.740 -0.093** 
AcqMTB 3.496 4.854 -1.358*** 
Goodwill 0.560 0.535 0.025 
NG 0.059 0.112 -0.053** 
        
 
This panel presents descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables for the 
sample. I separate the observations based on Write Down. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests) using 












 Incentive Pay and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude 
This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in each 
column is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, and 
Bonus/NEIP. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values 
  (1) (2) (3) 






     
Bonus - -0.021**   
  (0.031)   
NEIP -  -0.017*  
   (0.059)  
Bonus/NEIP -   -0.024** 
    (0.026) 
Def Rev (Book)  0.393*** 0.394*** 0.392*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR  -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 
  (0.260) (0.271) (0.256) 
TrgPM  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.449) (0.431) (0.449) 
AcqPM  -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 
  (0.224) (0.202) (0.206) 
PeerPM  -0.041 -0.052 -0.045 
  (0.635) (0.555) (0.616) 
TrgPublic  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.785) (0.769) (0.777) 
PctStock  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.822) (0.783) (0.790) 
DealSize  0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 
  (0.029) (0.012) (0.016) 
Relative  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.379) (0.358) (0.372) 
SameInd  -0.009* -0.010** -0.009* 
  (0.057) (0.047) (0.054) 
AcqMTB  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.682) (0.830) (0.850) 
Goodwill  -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.062*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant  0.012 0.005 0.010 
  (0.663) (0.849) (0.725) 
Observations  334 334 334 
Adjusted R-squared  0.523 0.522 0.524 
Trg. Industry & Year FE  YES YES YES 
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are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 




Non-GAAP Incentive Pay Metrics and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude 
  (1) (2) (3) 






     
Bonus - -0.020**   
  (0.032)   
NEIP -  -0.023*  
   (0.060)  
Bonus/NEIP -   -0.028** 
    (0.027) 
NG  0.001 -0.006 -0.009 
  (0.765) (0.268) (0.143) 
Bonus*NG + 0.005   
  (0.473)   
NEIP*NG +  0.053*  
   (0.051)  
Bonus/NEIP*NG +   0.061** 
    (0.030) 
     
F-Test B1+B3 =0  .06 2.20 2.56 
P-value  .8137 .1506 .1219 
Observations  334 334 334 
Adjusted R-squared  0.520 0.520 0.522 
Controls  YES YES YES 
Trg. Industry & Year FE  YES YES YES 
This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in 
columns (1) – (3) is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, 
Bonus/NEIP, Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of 




Non-GAAP Adjustments and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


















        
Bonus - -0.021**   -0.019**   
  (0.030)   (0.038)   
NEIP -  -0.016*   -0.025**  
   (0.090)   (0.038)  
Bonus/NEIP -   -0.024**   -0.028** 
    (0.031)   (0.022) 
NG Organic  -0.009 0.002 -0.002    
  (0.242) (0.808) (0.886)    
NG Def Rev     0.009** -0.007* -0.009** 
     (0.032) (0.056) (0.035) 
Bonus*NG Organic + 0.156      
  (0.161)      
NEIP*NG Organic +  -0.049     
   (0.905)     
Bonus/NEIP* +   -0.029    
NG Organic    (0.736)    
Bonus*NG Def Rev +    -0.080   
     (0.902)   
NEIP*NG Def Rev +     0.093***  
      (0.001)  
Bonus/NEIP* +      0.092*** 
NG Def Rev       (0.001) 
        
F-Test B1+B3 =0  .76 4.84 1.91 2.87 8.93 8.26 
P-value  .3927 .0373 .1795 .1026 .0062 .0082 
Observations  334 334 334 334 334 334 
Adjusted R-squared  0.520 0.520 0.521 0.520 0.521 0.522 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trg. Industry & 
Year FE 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in each 
column is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, Bonus/NEIP, 
Bonus*NG Organic, NEIP *NG Organic, Bonus/NEIP*NG Organic, Bonus*NG Def Rev, NEIP*NG 
Def Rev, and Bonus/NEIP*NG Def Rev. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target 
industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of interest, and 





Incentive Pay and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Prediction Write-Down Write-Down Write-Down 
     
Bonus - -0.056   
  (0.404)   
NEIP -  -0.009  
   (0.468)  
Bonus/NEIP -   -0.046 
    (0.376) 
Def Rev (Book)  0.757*** 0.762*** 0.757*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR  -0.293 -0.293 -0.293 
  (0.233) (0.232) (0.229) 
TrgPM  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AcqPM  -0.019 -0.022 -0.019 
  (0.808) (0.775) (0.805) 
PeerPM  0.421 0.400 0.409 
  (0.204) (0.192) (0.187) 
TrgPublic  -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 
  (0.118) (0.125) (0.122) 
PctStock  0.123** 0.122** 0.121** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) 
Relative  0.008** 0.008** 0.008* 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) 
DealSize  0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SameInd  0.020 0.019 0.020 
  (0.847) (0.850) (0.847) 
AcqMTB  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.031) (0.037) (0.027) 
Goodwill  -0.310*** -0.316*** -0.310*** 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant  0.067 0.055 0.060 
  (0.506) (0.642) (0.586) 
Observations  334 334 334 
Adj. R-squared  0.184 0.184 0.185 
Trg. Industry & Year FE  YES YES YES 
     
This table presents the results of the linear probability regression analysis. The dependent variable in 
each column is Write Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values are presented 
below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 




Non-GAAP Incentive Pay Metrics and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Prediction Write-Down Write-Down Write-Down 
     
Bonus - -0.062   
  (0.392)   
NEIP -  0.110  
   (0.122)  
Bonus/NEIP -   0.023 
    (0.445) 
NG  -0.019 0.173** 0.190 
  (0.752) (0.026) (0.131) 
Bonus*NG + 0.522   
  (0.180)   
NEIP*NG +  -1.134  
   (0.992)  
Bonus/NEIP *NG +   -1.109 
    (0.958) 
Observations  334 334 334 
Adjusted R-squared  0.179 0.189 0.189 
Controls  YES YES YES 
Trg. Industry & Year FE  YES YES YES 
This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in 
columns (1) – (3) is Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, Bonus/NEIP, 
Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by 
target industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of 
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